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Abstract
This Master's of Natural Resource Management and Geography project assesses the potential 
liability the State of Alaska faces with the non-bonded coverage of Dismantle, Removal, and Restoration 
obligations associated with hydrocarbon leases on state managed lands in Cook Inlet. There are four 
components to this assessment. First, a Chain-of-Title spreadsheet documents the percentage of 
Working Interest Ownership held by all companies in study leases from the time of first production 
through February 2015. Second, a Degrees-of-Separation spreadsheet measures the layers of corporate 
separation from previous lessees to entities in existence today that could perform obligations. Third, a 
Special Purpose Entity spreadsheet indicates lease percentages held by companies with corporate 
histories of less than three years prior to assumption of a Cook Inlet lease. And four, a written opus that 
describes the relationships between these spreadsheets and how they demonstrate that under current 
mechanisms of non-bonded coverage the State of Alaska's exposure to Dismantle, Removal, and 
Restoration liability increases through time as the hydrocarbon reserves in the ground reach the end of 
productive life.
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Introduction
The State of Alaska's very existence is tied to hydrocarbon resource development. The discovery 
of commercial quantities of oil at Swanson River in 1957 enabled the territory to make the economic 
case for statehood in 1959. Unique among the states, at statehood Alaska reserved for itself the mineral 
rights on lands it selected from the federal government and over its territorial seas, which extend three 
miles from the coastline. State lands in Cook Inlet have experienced waves of exploration and 
development, with peak production reached in 1970. Today, Cook Inlet is a mature oil basin with aging 
oil and gas infrastructure.
The extraction of hydrocarbons from state lands is contractually handled through an oil and gas 
lease. Leases grant their holders temporal access to specified state acreage along with certain rights and 
obligations associated with development. Among these is the obligation that upon termination of the 
lease the lessee, if so directed by the lessor, is required to "remove from the leased area or portion of 
the leased area all machinery, equipment, tools, and materials...and deliver up the leased area or those 
portions of the leased area in good condition (ADOG, 2009)". Collectively, these responsibilities are 
referred to as Dismantle, Removal, and Restoration (DR&R).
Lease language allows for the original lessee to transfer ownership, with the approval of the 
state, prior to the termination of the lease. This transfer does not indemnify the lessee from any 
obligations that accrued prior to the approval of the transfer. It does, however, create a situation where 
the firms responsible for improvements to the land may no longer be present, or in existence, when the 
accrued DR&R obligations are triggered.
The costs of hydrocarbon exploration and initial infrastructure development are substantial, as 
are geological and engineering uncertainties. Exploration and development is thus a high-risk business, 
particularly in the remote and challenging conditions of Alaska. Accordingly, one should expect that the 
original Cook Inlet lessees were large, well capitalized firms. Oil and gas development globally presents a 
general trend: as the quantity of economically recoverable reserves is depleted, ownership of leases 
transfers from large corporations to smaller entities that may find more value in bringing the last 
production out of mature fields. Although this turnover can be a positive for maximizing resource
recovery, it does present risks for the lessor. Once economic production opportunities have been 
exhausted, successor lessees may have inadequate financial resources to fulfill DR&R obligations.
The state's exposure to the risk of lessees being unable to perform their DR&R obligations 
became apparent in March of 2009 when Pacific Energy Resources Ltd (PERL) filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy. PERL, through its wholly owned subsidiary Pacific Energy Alaska Operations LLC, assumed 
control of Forest Oil's assets in Cook Inlet late in 2007. Among these were interests in nine fields, three 
onshore facilities, seven offshore platforms, six platform drill rigs and a stake in the Cook Inlet Pipeline. 
During bankruptcy proceedings, the Court granted PERL the right to abandon its assets in Alaska and all 
associated contractual obligations. Should another buyer not be found immediately, the state would 
have had to cover the cost of supporting this infrastructure until responsibility could be assigned. 
Fortunately, an entity agreed to purchase a portion of these assets in December 2009, with the 
remainder sold to another in November 2012.
To insulate itself from the risk of lessee non-performance of DR&R obligations, the state can rely 
on two types of assurances; bonded, and non-bonded. Bonded assurances are those surety bonds, 
escrow accounts, or other mechanisms that provide monies the state has unequivocal access to. They 
are permanent, irrefutable, and immediately available. Non-bonded coverage is simply the capacity of 
the lessee to meet obligations once Cook Inlet hydrocarbon production has ended. This assurance is 
dynamic, conditional, and subject to the state's legal ability to ensure performance. The focus of this 
project is to assess the exposure of the state associated with the non-bonded coverage of DR&R 
liabilities1.
Statutory and lease language are read by the state to create two layers of non-bonded 
assurances. The first is the financial capacity of current lessees to perform. This capacity can change 
rapidly, subject to internal and external drivers. The second is the financial wherewithal of previous 
lessees. Under the chain-of-title theory, the state assumes DR&R liability accrues the moment the 
infrastructure is installed, allowing it to secure obligation performance from all lessees at that point 
forward. The capacity of prior lessees is similarly as dynamic as today's lessees, with the added 
complication of finding companies that exist across time.
1 The collateral the state holds, in the form of bonds and other sureties, is covered in Appendix A. At this time, 
there is no policy standard for the setting of these guarantees.
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The protection provided by the chain-of-title theory becomes more precarious as the links of the 
chain increase in number and weaker links are introduced. This study seeks to determine the number, 
and to provide an initial assessment of the strength, of each link in the ownership chain for every 
producing State of Alaska lease in Cook Inlet. It will demonstrate that one practical measure of link 
weakness is highly correlated with whether the lessee is -  or was -  a special purpose entity created 
solely for the acquisition of leases in Cook Inlet. Furthermore, it shows that the rate of weak link 
formation is increasing as the hydrocarbons in the ground reach the end of their reserves.
Practical limitations affect this study's scope. Because the objective of this project is to assess 
the state's exposure to DR&R liability, only state leases are considered.2 As well, the chain of custody is 
only assessed for actively producing leases. Leases that have not entered production of paying 
quantities of oil will not be considered as the improvements to the land that DR&R concerns itself with 
will most likely not be in place. Similarly, leases that have been terminated, and are no longer in 
production, should have already met their contractual obligation to return the land to a condition 
satisfactory to the Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (ADNR). The seventy- 
nine total leases that meet the project criteria are shown in Figure 1. A final limitation is that this study 
will not measure the DR&R risks associated with pipeline right of ways. Although a crucial component of 
hydrocarbon development, these have separate statutory and contractual obligations.
2 The State of Alaska, Federal Government, Native Corporations, and the Mental Health Trust each issue 
hydrocarbon leases in Cook Inlet. All offshore leasing at this time is on state territorial waters.
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Figure 1: Seventy-nine Producing Leases on State Lands Meeting Study Parameters
Credit: (Pike, 2015)
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Background and Overview
This section provides an overview of the means by which lease ownership is obtained and 
transferred, the improvements to the land made in Cook Inlet, and the regulations concerning DR&R.
Leasing
Oil and gas leases are awarded through a competitive bidding process. The process begins when 
the State of Alaska releases a best interest finding that tracts of land will be available for leasing. The 
notice provides a date and location where interested parties may submit their bid amount for an 
available parcel of land. There are minimal qualifications necessary to participate in lease bidding and 
ownership. Established in 1959, one need only to be a U.S. citizen 18 years of age or older, or a 
corporation qualified to do business in the state.3 The age and citizenry requirements may also be 
satisfied with other caveats, such as intent to become a U.S. citizen.
On the day of awarding, all bids are read in a public location, with the highest bidder for each 
lease receiving the rights to move forward with lease contracts. Exploration in Cook Inlet began prior to 
the competitive bidding system becoming mandated. In a non-competitive environment, leases are 
awarded on a first come first serve basis. This made it possible for individuals to be the original lessee on 
some of Cook Inlet's older leases.
Lease boundaries are typically drawn before the nature of the reserves beneath it can be fully 
understood. For this reason, during development lessees may segment or pool their interests in order to 
efficiently produce a hydrocarbon reservoir. The resource and contractual terminology that guide this 
land management are summarized in Table 1.
A lease grants to the lessee two types of ownership that may be subdivided or shared; Working 
Interest Owners (WIO) and Overriding Royalty Interests (ORRI). A WIO is responsible for the costs of 
drilling and work necessary for production, receives a share of production, and must also pay for DR&R. 
An ORRI holder receives the benefits from production without any of the capital investment or liability 
ORRI's are commonly created as a means of raising capital: the WIO sells a portion its future production 
in exchange for a lump sum today. ORRI's can also be created when the original WIO sells their lease 
rights and obligations to another party, usually for a lump sum plus the ORRI percentage of future
3 AS 38.05.190
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production, to be delivered free and clear of expenses.4 For this study, only WIO lease interests will be 
discussed as ORRIs are not contractually obligated to perform DR&R.
Table 1: Hydrocarbon Contractual Terminology
Term Definition
Field A general area which is underlain or appears to be
underlain by at least one pool, and includes the 
underground reservoir containing oil or gas. The words 
'pool' and 'field' mean the same thing when only one 
underground reservoir is involved, but 'field' unlike 
'pool' may relate to two or more pools.5
Pool An underground reservoir containing, or appearing to 
contain, a common accumulation of oil or gas. Each 
zone of a general structure which is completely 
separated from any other zone in the structure is 
covered by the term 'pool'.6
Segment A subdivision of a lease that grants ownership to
different segments of acreage. Segmentation can be 
done vertically or horizontally, but is most often 
associated with vertical delineations. Vertical stratus 
may allow owners to produce different pools of 
resources. At the request of the lessee and with the 
approval of the division, segments can be reassigned 
their own lease number with the same effective date of 
the original lease.7
Unit Unitization is the grouping or pooling of working 
interest and royalty ownership in oil and gas leases that 
overlay a common petroleum reservoir. It is a method 
for developing oil or gas pools that shares costs, 
maximizes ultimate recovery, prevents economic and 
physical waste, and protects the rights of all parties 
with an ownership interest in the accumulation.8
Participating Area Land reasonably known to be underlain by
hydrocarbons and known or reasonably estimated 
through use of geological, geophysical, or engineering 
data to be capable of producing or contributing to 
production of hydrocarbons in paying quantities that 
shall be committed to a Unit9
4 This was the case with the individuals that procured leases early in Cook Inlet's history. They did not have the 
capital to develop the land themselves, but acquired the parcels anticipating that a corporation with an adjoining 
leasehold would determine that the individual's lease sits over a hydrocarbon pool.
5 AS 31.15.050 (2)
6 AS 31.05.170 (11)
7 AS 38.05.920 (a)
8 11 AAC 88.185 (27)
9 11 AAC 83.351 (a)
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Transfers
Lease language and state regulations allow a lease, "with the approval of the state, be assigned, 
subleased, or otherwise transferred to any person or persons qualified10 to hold a lease". 11 Throughout 
the majority of Cook Inlet's history, the Assignment Approval documents issued by the Commissioner's 
office succinctly articulate that the transfer will not adversely affect the state's interests and that the 
assignment is approved. The process and content of assignment approvals has evolved as concern over 
the risk associated with these transfers has increased. More recently, Assignment Approvals became 
several page documents enumerating conditions for these transfers. These conditions can be the 
financial protections discussed in Appendix A or qualifications such as monthly meetings with the Alaska 
Division of Oil and Gas (ADOG), and reports outlining capital expenditures planned for development.
Although it has the authority to approve or disapprove transfers, the state has no specific 
authority entitling it to review the Purchase and Sale Agreements (PSA) negotiated between companies 
for properties. PSAs are private commercial contracts. Accordingly, while the state may request to see 
these, or other assurances that the state's interest is protected in the deal, companies are under no 
legal obligation to provide even un-redacted versions of them. Some documents pertaining to these 
PSAs and Assignment Approvals are available in public case files, but many remain confidential.
Lease transfer language serves as the basis for the state's chain-of-title theory, and the 
associated non-bonded coverage it provides. As Section 31 of the DL-1 lease, and Section 18 of the 
state's so-called "New Form" lease explain,
The lessee shall remain liable for all obligations under this lease accruing 
prior to the approval by the state of any assignment, sublease, or other 
transfer of an interest in this lease. All provisions of this lease will 
extend to and be binding upon the heirs, administrators, successors, 
and assigns of the state and the lessee (ADNR, 2009) (ADNR, 1961).
A natural reading of this language that protects the state would have DR&R liability accruing the 
moment that improvements are made to the land. Therefore, any lessee from that point forward "shall 
remain liable". Furthermore, as this liability is "binding upon all heirs" of the lessee, any company that 
subsequently purchases or takes over a lessee can also be subject to this liability.
10 AS 38.05.190
11 11 AAC 82.605 (a)
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Lease transfer language and PSAs discuss DR&R obligations in potentially conflicting ways. 
Documents in the public record indicate that this liability is something that companies negotiate over as 
terms in the transfer. As an example, in a June 2012 letter to the Commissioner, Hilcorp Alaska LLC and 
ExxonMobil Alaska Production explain;
Per the terms of the PSA, Hilcorp has agreed to assume the dismantle, 
removal, and restoration ("DR&R") obligations to the Department 
under the leases with respect to the interests being assigned by 
ExxonMobil in the South Granite Point Unit (Rebrook, 2012).
This language suggests that ExxonMobil believes it assigned its share of the DR&R liability to Hilcorp. 
Whether DR&R liability can be transferred, or when it is accrued, are questions beyond the scope of this 
project; at day's end they are more likely than not to be answered in Court. Instead, the focus here is on 
understanding the strength of the second layer of non-bonded coverage, assuming that the state 
generally prevails in its chain-of-title theory that that all parties are subject to DR&R liability.
Infrastructure
One of the rights granted with lease ownership is the right to make improvements to the land to 
facilitate hydrocarbon production. These improvements in Cook Inlet include sixteen offshore platforms, 
five onshore oil and gas processing facilities, the Drift River Marine terminal, pads, wells, and hundreds 
of miles of oil and gas pipelines and flow lines. A general overview of this infrastructure is depicted in 
Figure 2.
Fourteen of the sixteen offshore platforms were installed between 1964 and 1968. The other 
two, Steelhead and Osprey, were put in place in 1986 and 2000 respectively. Of those original fourteen, 
four are in "lighthouse mode", meaning they are inactive with all wells shut in. Spark and Spurr were put 
in lighthouse mode in 1992 when production fell off to a level deemed uneconomic to continue 
operations (Donohue, 1996). Although Spurr has remained shut-in since 1992, Spark temporarily 
resumed gas production in the late 1990's and early 2000's, with all operations again ceasing in 2007 
(AOGCC, 2015). Baker entered "lighthouse mode" in 2003, but was brought back online for periodic gas 
production from 2007 through 2014. In October 2014, a fire broke out on the Baker platform with gas 
production indefinitely shut-down from its one producing gas well (Hollander, 2014). Dillon was also 
shut-in in 2003, and as the only platform in the South Middle Ground Shoal Unit has remained in 
"lighthouse mode" since that time.
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The leases for these platforms are still considered active even though there is no production at 
this time. Lease extension language provides circumstances other than production that allow a lease to 
remain active, including commitment to a Unit Agreement or efforts at reworking or drilling operations 
(ADOG, 2009). These platforms are deemed to have met one of the conditions for activity; therefore, 
the obligations under termination to perform DR&R have not been triggered.12
Figure 2: Cook Inlet Platforms and Infrastructure
Credit: (ADOG, 2013)
12 Independent assessment of future DR&R costs is beyond the scope of the project. However, Appendix B 
references prior studies that are in the public domain that provide indication of the scope of State exposure.
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DR&R Obligations
The ADNR and the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (AOGCC) are responsible 
ensuring performance of DR&R. The AOGCC administers all well permits in the state, regardless of land 
ownership. Their objective is to ensure the ultimate recovery of resources through conservation and 
protection practices (AOGCC, 2014). In line with this mandate, AOGCC's DR&R requirements are 
confined to the proper plugging and abandonment (P&A) of wells. AOGCC standards for how wells are 
to be P&A are enumerated in 20 AAC 25.102-172.
ADNR administers the state's oil and gas leasing program and overseas the monitoring of 
essentially all hydrocarbon exploration and development activity (Rothe, 2005). ADNR does not have 
explicit performance standards for DR&R. Instead, by statute that is incorporated into the lease 
contract, ADNR has broad and discretionary power over both timing and level of DR&R performance 
(see AS 38.05.090).
a) Unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the commissioner, a lessee 
shall remove from a former leasehold (1) all personal property, 
including above-ground tanks, transportable buildings, equipment, 
machinery, tools, and other goods, not belonging to the state, within 30 
days after termination of the lease; and (2) all buildings and fixtures, 
including gravel pads, and below-ground tanks, foundations, and slabs, 
not belonging to the state, within 60 days after termination of the lease.
(b) Unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the commissioner, the 
lessee shall restore the leasehold to a good and marketable condition, 
acceptable to the commissioner, within 120 days after termination of 
the lease.13
While the default assumption is that extensive DR&R will be performed in an expeditious manner, 
language gives the Commissioner broad authority for variance. Any structures that remain on the land at 
the behest of the Commissioner become the property of the State of Alaska. If the lessee does not 
restore the land to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, then the state may complete this work and 
charge the lessee for the cost. Lease language contains similar directives, but different timelines for the 
performance of DR&R;
The lessee will be directed in writing by the state and will have the right 
at any time within a period of one year after the termination, or any 
extension of that period as may be granted by the state, to remove from
13 AS 38.05.090
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the leased area or portion of the leased area all machinery, equipment, 
tools, and materials (ADOG, 2009).
Moreover, the lease elaborates on the state taking control of property it elects to keep from the lease.
At the option of the state, all improvements such as roads, pads, and 
wells must either be abandoned and the sites rehabilitated by the 
lessee to the satisfaction of the state, or be left intact and the lessee 
absolved of all further responsibility as to their maintenance, repair, and 
eventual abandonment and rehabilitation (ADOG, 2009).
The state wears liability for improvements not removed and land not rehabilitated. Accordingly, the 
capacity of lessees to perform DR&R is of particular state concern. Although the ultimate performance 
standards of DR&R are important for policy, the remainder of this report will focus on the non-bonded 
coverage options available to meet the Commissioner's directive, whatever it may be.
Methods
First Layer of Non-bonded Coverage: Existing Lessee Capacity
The financial capacity of lessees to perform their DR&R obligations forms the first layer of non­
bonded coverage. To assess the strength of this assurance, coverage analysis begins by creating a 
complete list of actively producing leases on state lands. The Cook Inlet Unit Land and Lease Working 
Interest Ownership map displays all units within Cook Inlet and indicates their land ownership and 
production status (ADOG, 2014). Sixteen units are currently meeting study parameters: Deep Creek, Ivan 
River, Kasilof, Lewis River, Nicolai Creek, Nikolaevsk, Ninilchik, North Cook Inlet, North Trading Bay, 
Pretty Creek, Redoubt, South Granite Point, South Middle Ground Shoal, Stump Lake, Trading Bay, and 
West McArthur River. ADL lease numbers for all producing leases in these units were obtained from the 
ADOG's Ownership o f Units and Producing Leases. There are seventy-three leases contained in active 
units. In addition, the same document indicates production from an additional six non-unitized leases in 
state waters (ADOG, 2015). The seventy-nine leases selected from this were then cross-referenced with 
ADOG Royalty Division's CI Lease Production Database Spreadsheet to assure accuracy (ADOG, 2015).
The ADOG updates the Oil and Gas Lease Ownership report monthly (ADOG, 2015). For every 
lease in the state, it shows the WIO percentage held by a company in all segments. The March 2, 2015 
version of this lists nine companies as WIO in the study leases: Hilcorp Alaska LLC, Aurora Gas LLC,
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ConocoPhillips Alaska Inc, ConocoPhillips Company, Cook Inlet Energy LLC, Apache Alaska Co, Buccaneer 
Alaska LLC, ExxonMobil Oil, and XTO Energy Inc.
How capable are these companies to perform DR&R obligations? One common metric for 
judging a company's financial fitness is the evaluation of a Z-score. The Z-score is a unitary index that 
combines a number of potential indicators such as working capital, retained earnings, market value of 
equity, sales, total assets, and total losses. Information to populate the Z-score formula can be found in 
the audited financial statements publically available with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
However, only publicly traded companies must make SEC filings. Just two of the nine current Cook Inlet 
lessees are publicly traded. Accordingly, a transparent public assessment of DR&R liability in Cook Inlet 
liability cannot be made.
Without a direct means of measurement, we rely on proprietary credit evaluative services. Dun 
& Bradstreet maintains the world's largest database for commercial credit worthiness. The metrics they 
have developed is the D&B Standard Marketing Prescreen Score, which predicts the likelihood of a firm 
paying in a severely delinquent manner, 90+ days past terms, over the next 12 months. Using a 
company's most recent payment history and D&B's proprietary statistical models, they rank if a 
company is at low, medium, or high risk for default.
Second Layer of Non-bonded Coverage: Chain-of-Title Theory
If a current lessee lacks the financial wherewithal to perform DR&R, the chain-of-title theory 
could give the state recourse to the financial capacity of previous lease holders. Analysis of the strength 
of this second layer of state protection took place in two parts. Part One identifies the links that 
compose this chain, and Part Two continues initial investigation into the strength of these links.
Part One: Understanding the Chain
To facilitate understanding of the links in lease history, this project created the Chain-of-Title 
spreadsheet, which documents the percentage of WIO of every segment for each study lease from the 
time of first production. The ownership data necessary to populate this can be found online at the ADNR 
Land Administration System. This system provides case file summaries of all transfers of WIO and ORRI 
by segment and percentage. These data were manually scanned and input into the spreadsheet.
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Each active unit has its own spreadsheet tab indicating lease ownership; the disparate non­
unitized leases are combined into their own tab. Percentage of ownership in each segment of each lease 
is arranged by rows, while ownership in that portion of the lease is tracked across time in columns, from 
1961 through February 2015. Every unique company that has held an ownership interest in a producing 
Cook Inlet lease is assigned a unique identification number. All told 61 such companies have owned 
Cook Inlet leases. For any year that a lease segment is in production, the corresponding company code is 
entered in the designated percentage of working interest ownership. Anytime this unique ownership is 
transferred, the spreadsheet highlights the cell.
In populating the Chain-of-Title spreadsheet certain structuring decisions were made.
1. Ownership history until just prior to first production is disregarded, on the grounds that no 
DR&R liability accrues until improvements have been made14.
2. Only ownership of 30 days are greater are recorded. The assumption is that no material 
improvements were made during periods in which ownership interest was held for less than 30 
days.
a. Example: Company X transfers to Holding Company Y. 3 days later Holding Company Y 
transfers to Company Z. The spreadsheet will only show transaction of X to Z.
3. A name change, without a change in ownership structure, does not change the ID number; in 
essence, we treat name changes as not being ownership changes.
4. Companies that result from a merger or acquisition, and are assigned leases, are considered 
unique owners and given a new lessee ID.
5. WIO percentages reflect each lease's actual fractional ownership history.
The spreadsheet therefore maps the ownership history of every portion of ownership in every 
Cook Inlet lease likely to have improvements subject to state DR&R obligations. Because each ownership 
percentage constitutes a unique row, the spreadsheet shows the total number of owners and when 
each owner occupied (and potentially further improved) the lease. The capacity of the owners across 
time to perform the DR&R obligations constitutes the state's backstop security.
14 This may understate the total DR&R liability. Improvements for exploration activities that were not subject to 
DR&R would be excluded by this assumption. The painstaking process of assessing DR&R obligations that are either 
not tied to a current producing or active lease, or accrued to improvements that happened years prior to first 
production followed by lease interest transfer of ownership, is left to future research.
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Figure 3 provides an example of the Chain-of-Title spreadsheet layout. The first number on the 
left indicates that this is lease ADL 17589. Two of the segments, 1 and X are broken down according to 
the percentage of ownerships that are assigned. Beneath each year and in accordance with the 
percentage of ownership, the spreadsheet shows the numeric code of the corresponding company, such 
as "15" for the Pan American Petroleum Company. A company index at the front of the spreadsheet, as 
well as the formula box when a cell is highlighted, reveal the company name that the code tracks.
Figure 3: Example of How the Chain-of-Title Spreadsheet Tracks Lease Ownership
The next step was to learn more about the companies involved. The study asked four questions, 
which indirectly provide evidence of either financial fitness or likelihood of having directly generated 
DR&R obligations.
a) When was the company established?
b) How long did they remain in Cook Inlet?
c) What happened to the company after they relinquished their lease ownership?
d) How many "degrees of separation" between the lessee and a company that currently 
exists that might be called upon to perform DR&R?
Knowing when a company was established provides a measurement of company existence prior 
to arrival in Cook Inlet. The duration during which a company so existed is an indirect indication of the
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company's independent financial wherewithal to perform DR&R. Companies that were formed just prior 
to acquiring Cook Inlet leases are likely to have little independent capacity.15
To determine the date of lessee company formation, the study referenced company websites 
for their own accounts of their corporate history. If information was not available here, the Petroleum 
Archives Project of the University of Virginia and other academic compilations were relied upon. When 
these resources were exhausted, we assume company formation begins with the company's acquisition 
of a state business license. These dates were taken from the Alaska Department of Commerce, 
Community, and Economic Development's online database, which contains business license records for 
all companies that have been active in the state.
Measuring how long a company existed in Cook Inlet can indicate whether they were a major or 
minor player in the basin. Companies present for multiple years would be most likely to have made 
improvements to the land or been a beneficiary of the capital improvements of another company, tying 
them to the infrastructure. This is calculated from the effective date of lease ownership, or transfer from 
another entity, to when their transfer to another was approved by ADOG.
Understanding what has happened to a company since they assigned away WIO provides a 
measure of whether that is a link in the chain that can be called upon to make good on obligations. For 
all companies, they either exist as the same entity on the title, are the same company but have 
undergone a name change, merged or were acquired by another company, declared bankruptcy, or 
been dissolved. Between October 2014 and February 2015, the study gathered this information from 
the lease and unit case files available at the ADOG for public review. Supplemental data was also 
acquired through a variety business and periodical resources, including Bloomberg, New York Times, and 
Oil and Gas Journal. For companies that declared bankruptcy, or experienced mergers and acquisitions, 
the study documented the new parent or purchasing company in order to create a corporate family 
tree.
From these family trees, it is possible to count "degrees of separation"; defined here as the 
number of companies one would have to assign obligations through before reaching an entity that could 
be called upon to make good on contractual agreements. There are two types of separation that exist 
between corporate entities. One is the separation between a parent company and its wholly owned
15 The capacity of the lessee's parent, if any, remains an open question.
15
subsidiary, and the other is the relationship between a company and another that it combines with to 
form a new company. Subsidiaries are considered independent agents under the law. Accordingly, the 
burden of proof required to show that a parent shares in a subsidiary's liabilities is high. In principle, one 
of the reasons a subsidiary is created is to shield the parent from liability. The other means of forming a 
degree of separation is through company mergers or acquisitions. In this case, the assignment of assets 
and obligations is more conspicuous through commercial contracts, thereby lowering the burden of 
proof that obligations are shared. This study does not differentiate between the difficulties in assigning 
these obligations, but rather quantifies the most direct line between a no longer existing corporation 
and a possible surety.
As a general rule, the more degrees of separation there are, the weaker the link in the chain 
becomes. While it may be possible to legally pin a company's contractual obligations to another entity, 
the amount of resources necessary to pierce this corporate veil becomes greater the more layers there 
are to go through. The more resources or time required of the state to enforce a contract, the greater 
the likelihood would be that it would settle for a lesser amount of money.
The Degrees-of-Separation spreadsheet tracks these layers using the same layout created for 
the Chain-of-Title. The rules to populate it are as follows:
1. If a company exists under the same ownership structure as when it first held a Cook Inlet lease, 
it is coded as a 1.
2. Name changes that did not result from a change in ownership are also coded as 1.
3. If a company has experienced a merger or acquisition resulting in a new entity that is only one 
company off from the original lessee, it is given a 2
a. Example: Conoco Inc and Phillips Petroleum have now merged to become
ConocoPhillips Corp. Any lease segment previously owned by either of these companies 
is given a 2.
4. Codes of 3 or 4 are given if a company is 2 or 3 degrees away from original ownership.
a. Example: Halbouty Alaska Oil no longer exists. In 1986 Texaco Inc took over Halbouty 
Alaska Oil and created Texaco Alaska Inc. In July 1990, Texaco Alaska Inc was merged 
into Texaco Producing Inc. In 2001, Texaco Inc and its subsidiaries were merged with 
the Chevron Corp. Therefore, any lease of Halbouty Alaska Oil has 3 degrees of 
separation and is coded a 4.
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5. Code of 5 is a stop gate. This means the company has been dissolved or bankrupt and that no 
one acquired the rights and obligations of its contracts.
6. A highlighted border on a cell indicates a lease transfer took place
Using the same lease example as Figure 3, Figure 4 shows the layout for the Degrees-of-Separation 
Spreadsheet.
Figure 4: Example of How the Degrees-of-Separation Spreadsheet Tracks the Number of 
Links between Previous Lessees and a Surviving Entity That May Perform Obligations
Part Two: Special Purpose Entities
Initial analysis of the companies in the chain presented an interesting trend. The six companies 
that went bankrupt, and seven that were dissolved, ultimately broken links in the ownership chain of 
title, existed on average for only 2.6 and 1.86 years respectively, prior to obtaining a working interest 
ownership. This is a far shorter duration than companies at other operational statuses (Figure5). These 
companies, apparently created solely for the acquisition of Cook Inlet leases, are referred to here as 
Special Purpose Entities (SPE). SPE may be either a newly formed independent company or a wholly 
owned subsidiary of a larger corporation, such as ARCO Alaska Inc.
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Figure 5: Present Day Operational Status and the Average Number of Years Those Companies
Existed Prior to WIO in Cook Inlet Lease
The Special Purpose Entity Spreadsheet reveals the accumulation of companies that existed for 
less than three years prior to entrance in Cook Inlet by using the same format as the Chain-of-Title and 
Degrees-of-Separation. The coding for it is as follows:
1. If a company existed less than 3 years prior to WIO, it is coded 1
2. Code of 2 is used for all other companies
3. A highlighted border on a cell indicates when a lease transfer took place
The three different indirect measures of lessee financial capacity to perform DR&R obligations 
raise an obvious question: are they correlated? That is, does being a special purpose entity correlate 
with the likelihood of the lessee's successor going bankrupt or being dissolved? Similarly, does being a 
special purpose entity correlate with the degrees of separation between the lessee and its ultimate 
successor or assigns? If so, then there might be good policy grounds for requiring different levels of 
bonded coverage for special purpose entities.
To investigate whether a correlation exists between special purpose entities and degrees of 
separation, the study performed an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). ANOVA is a statistical method used to
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compare the means between two or more groups. If a company's status as a SPE serves as an indicator 
of higher degrees of separation, then the mean degrees of separation for SPE will be higher than the 
means for all other companies. Observation points to test this are extracted from the spreadsheets at 
any time that a lease link is created and whenever a link is transferred.16. At the observation point, data 
pairs are created using the status as a SPE (1 or 2) as the X and degrees of separation as the Y. For 
example, Halbouty Alaska Oil has an ordered pair of (1, 4) because it is a SPE (1) and there are three 
degrees of separation between it and the Chevron Corporation, a company that may be able to meets 
its contractual obligations (4).17
Results
First Layer of Non-bonded Coverage: Existing Lessee Capacity
There are nine companies that hold a WIO in study leases as of March 2, 2015. These companies 
and the shares of ownerships they have in all study leases are depicted in Figure 6. Lease segmentation 
and joint ownership are indicated by multiple color shadings within one lease outline.
16 The final transfer is not counted as it will be to the present lease holder. Present lease holders are covered under 
the first layer of non-bonded coverage and not part of the chain's history.
17 The study also conducted analysis on longevity lengths other than 3 years to see if further delineations in age 
were significant. The results showed no statistical relationship between degrees-of-separation and other arbitrarily 
created categories of longevity.
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Figure 4: State Lands Lease Holdings in Cook Inlet by Company
Credit: (Pike, 2015)
20
D&B's Prescreen Marketing Score provides ratings for all but two of the Cook Inlet Companies. 
Apache Alaska Corp is not in their database; however, their parent Apache Corp does have a rating, 
which is used in its place. Buccaneer Alaska LLC is also not given a credit score, presumably because they 
have already entered bankruptcy proceedings. They are given a high risk score by default. The results of 
the D&B score are coded according to WIO lease percentage on the map in Figure 8 and summarized by 
company in Table 3. Figure 7 breaks down credit risk by offshore platforms. The percentages shown 
correspond to the percentage of the platforms held by different companies in the low, medium, and 
high risk ratings.
Figure 5: D&B Credit Risk for Platform Operators in Cook Inlet
J  Low 
O Med 
Q High
Table 2: D&B Credit Risk of Companies with WIO in Cook Inlet Leases
Company Risk
Apache Alaska Co Medium
Aurora Gas LLC Low
Buccaneer Alaska LLC High
ConocoPhillips Alaska Inc Low
ConocoPhillips Company Low
Cook Inlet Energy LLC High
ExxonMobil Oil Low
Hilcorp Alaska LLC Medium
XTO Energy Inc Low
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Figure 6: D&B Credit Risk of Companies According to Acreage Held in Cook Inlet
Credit: (Pike, 2015)
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Second Layer of Non-bonded Coverage: Chain-of-Title Theory
Part One: Understanding the Chain
The results of the Chain-of-Title and Degrees-of-Separation spreadsheets are located in Supplemental 
Docs 1 and 2.
Part Two: Special Purpose Entities
The results of the Special Purpose Entity spreadsheet is located in Supplemental Doc 3.
The ANOVA examined two groups of companies: Group 1 SPE and Group 2 all other companies. 
There are a total of fifty-four companies with observation points, twenty-five in Group 1 and twenty- 
nine in Group 2. The names of these companies and the respective shares of observation points from 
them are shown in Figures 9 and 10.
Although the sample size used to generate these data sets is of comparable size, each contained 
a company that accounted for nearly one third of the data. This bulk of observations points does not 
necessarily represent that these companies held a large share of Cook Inlet acreage, but rather that 
because the spreadsheets are set up to count churn of lease percentages they were involved at a time of 
high turnover for several smaller shares. These companies are ARCO Alaska Inc for Group 1 and Union 
Oil Co for Group 2.
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Figure 7: Company Percentage of Observation Points Group 1 - SPE
ARCO Alaska Inc 
Buccaneer Alaska LLC 
Forcenergy 
Hilcorp Alaska LLC 
Danco Alaska Partnership 
DANCO Inc
Exxon Mobil Alaska Production
Halbouty Alaska Oil
Alaska Gas Exploration
Lewis River Unit Partnership
Texaco Alaska Inc
Enstar Petroleum Co
Pacific Energy Alaska Operating LLC
Aurora Gas LLC 
Cook Inlet Energy LLC 
Forest Alaska Operations LLC 
MAP LLC
Danco Exploration 
Mobil Rocky Mountain 
Shell Western E&P 
Phillips Alaska Inc 
Pacific Lighting Gas 
Swift Energy Alaska 
Texas International 
Temex Energy Inc
10% 10% 3% 
1%
0%
0%
1%
1% 1% 0% 0%
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Figure 8: Company Percentage of Observation Points Group 2 - All Others
Anadarko Petroleum 
Forest Oil Inc 
Phillips Petroleum Co 
Standard Oil Co of Ca 
Union Oil Co 
Cross Timbers Oil Co 
Getty Oil 
Conoco Inc 
Cities Service Co 
TGX Corporation
Mobil Oil Co 
Marathon Oil Co 
Richfield Oil Co 
Superior Oil Co 
Shell Oil Co 
Sinclair Oil & Gas Co 
Atlantic Richfield Co 
Texaco Producing Inc 
McAlester Fuel Co
Chevron USA
Pan American Petroleum Co
Skelly Oil Co
Texaco Inc
Shell Offshore Inc
AMOCO
Atlantic Refining Co 
Cities Service Oil 
Oxy USA Inc
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Based on the observation points in this analysis, the study can say with 95% confidence that SPE 
on average have degrees of separation between 3.5221 and 3.6779. Comparatively, all other companies 
will range between 1.9403 and 2.0572. The tightness of these intervals is further summarized and 
shown in Table 4 and Figure 11.
Table 3: ANOVA for Degrees of Separation of Company Groups at 95% Confidence Interval
CL N Mean StDev 95%CI
1 460 3.6000 1.1264 (3.5221 3.6779)
2 816 1.9988 0.6468 (1.9403 2.0572)
Figure 9: Interval Plot for Degrees of Separation of Company Groups at 95% Confidence 
Interval
Interval Plot of DOS vs CL
95% CI for the Mean
CL
The pooled standard dev.ation was used to calculate the intervals.
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Given that ARCO Alaska Inc and Union Oil Co contributed significant shares of observation 
points, the study performed the ANOVA again omitting the points from these two companies in order to 
determine whether they may be skewing the data. The results of this analysis presented similar trends. 
At 95% confidence, Group 1's interval range for degrees of separation is between 3.3925 and 3.6015, an 
increase in variance of 0.0532. For Group 2, the 95% confidence interval is between 1.9184 and 2.0781, 
an increase in variance of 0.0425. The ANOVA table and interval plots for this are shown in Table 5 and 
Figure 12.
Table 4: Adjusted ANOVA for Degrees of Separation for Company Groups at 95% Confidence 
Interval
CL N Mean StDev 95% CI
1 336 3.4970 1.2531 (3.3925 3.6015)
2 576 1.9983 0.7701 (1.9184 2.0781)
Figure 10: Adjusted Interval Plot for Degrees of Separation for Company Groups at 95% 
Confidence Interval
Interval Plot of DOS vs CL
W W W W VW V VWW' VvW- WVW
95% Cl for the MeanV'VW' VWvV W/vW-
1 2 
CL
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Omitting ARCO Alaska Inc and Union Oil Co makes little difference to the results.
Discussion
First Layer of Non-bonded Coverage: Existing Lessee Capacity
The results demonstrate that there are potential weaknesses with the capacity of current Cook 
Inlet lessees. Only 17% of the acreage and 3 of the platforms are held by low risk companies. Medium 
risk companies hold 76% of the acreage and 12 of the platforms, with the remaining platform and 7% of 
the acreage held by a high risk company. Although D&B is a reputable vendor of corporate information, 
the analysis would benefit by being able to more precisely quantify this risk level. However, as 
previously discussed, most of the companies in Cook Inlet are privately held. Accordingly, the public 
record does not provide enough information to develop a more accurate metric.
The risk of default for these companies is at best an indirect indicator of whether they would 
meet contractual obligations to perform DR&R. In general, SPEs not backed by parent guarantees or 
bonding pose substantial risks of non-performance, as their only assets are the Cook Inlet reserves that 
they hold. The value of reserves left in the ground, if worth substantially more than the cost of DR&R 
performance, provides some state security as they might be able to attract a new acreage entrant given 
an SPE exit. In times of plentiful reserves or high prices for the commodities, this risk is lowered. If, 
however, a basin is reaching the end of productive life and the value for its hydrocarbons drops, this risk 
level is then heightened.
Determining the value of the oil and gas remaining in Cook Inlet is a complicated and necessarily 
contingent undertaking. Volatile commodity prices, operation and maintenance costs, State-offered 
exploration and development tax credits, royalty terms, and the economies of scale for production all 
have impacts. As a "snapshot" point of reference, estimates of the oil reserves along with their present 
and future projected prices may inform whether these risk estimates could be more or less than the 
D&B credit worthiness score.
Figure 11 shows high and low estimates of the proportion of cumulative Cook Inlet production 
to total reserves since commercial production commenced in 1958. While cumulative production is 
known, total reserves are not. The future production projections from the 2009 Alaska Oil and Gas
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Report 2009 generate the "high" cumulative production proportions (ADOG, 2009 ).18 The "low" 
cumulative production proportions are generated using the U.S. Geologic Survey's (USGS) 2011 
Assessment o f Undiscovered Oil and Gas Reserves of the Cook Inlet Region (USGS , 2011). The USGS 
numbers are "probabilistic estimates of undiscovered, technically recoverable resources. As such they 
probably represent an over-estimate of the upper bound of future production, as they include oil and 
gas reserves in small, non-economic accumulations" (ADOG, 2014).
Figure 11: High and Low Estimates of Cook Inlet Produced Oil Reserves
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Figure 14 shows the recent and projected domestic price per barrel of crude oil according to the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (U.S. EIA, 2015)
18 The annual reports past 2009 no longer include this information. When requests were made to the ADOG to 
obtain more recent figures, it was said that since 2010 this information is now considered to be taxpayer 
confidential.
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Figure 12: Current & Projected Domestic Cost of Crude Oil per Barrel
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The above graphs suggest that the amount of proven reserves and the recently falling prices of 
oil may compound the risk levels associated with current lessees; thus weakening the protection the 
state has from this form of non-bonded coverage.
Second Layer of Non-bonded Coverage: Chain-of-Title Theory
The ANOVA results suggest that SPE are more likely to have higher degrees of separation, 
thereby making them weaker links in the chain-of-title history. Furthermore, as previously discussed, 
there is a general trend in hydrocarbon production that over the course of field life ownership transfers 
from large corporations to smaller companies. It therefore becomes important to understand if the 
weak links in the Cook Inlet basin are indeed increasing over time.
In order to calculate this, cumulative production of oil and gas are plotted against the 
cumulative number of links in Cook Inlet controlled by a SPE. All else equal, the rate of change in the 
cumulative number of SPE links in Cook Inlet indicates periods during which state DR&R risks ratchet 
upward (Figure 15).
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Figure 13: Proportion of Cook Inlet Oil Reserves Produced and SPE Chain Links
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Figure 16 uses the total natural gas produced to date as 100% of reserves and similarly plots the 
cumulative SPE links against it.
Figure 14: Cook Inlet Gas Reserves Produced and Cumulative SPE Chain Links
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The results of Figures 15 and 16 support the conclusion that SPE are increasingly making up the 
chain-of-title for Cook Inlet leases. A conclusion further buttressed by the fact that SPE own roughly 90% 
of the acreage in study leases.
Cursory observations of the Chain-of-Title spreadsheet's basin wide history appear to show 
years where there is a particularly high turnover of leases, such as 1972, 1981, 1987, 1992, 2007 and 
2012. These years are examined to uncover if they represent an influx or decrease in the amount of 
acreage under SPE ownership; and whether there may be levels of production or commodity prices that 
could be triggering these transfers.
Figure 17 plots the bracketed percentage of oil reserves produced against the percentage of 
acreage in Cook Inlet owned by SPE. This graph reveals the entrance and exit of SPE that may not be 
fully illustrated in the cumulative shares analysis.
Figure 15: Cook Inlet Oil Production and Percentage of SPE Acreage
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Examination of this chart suggests that once the produced reserves reached 70% of the ADOG 
estimates and 50% of the USGS estimates there is a sharp increase in the acreage held by SPE. This may 
reveal that original lessees are ready to move on when a field reaches maturity, and that SPE are 
attracted to this sort of established basin. While it may not have been possible for those in the inlet at 
the time to have known the percentage of ultimate reserves produced, they could have been able to tell
32
if peak production had passed by monitoring basin wide production reports. Therefore, the amount of 
actual oil production against percentage of SPE acreage is show in Figure 18.
Figure 16: Annual Cook Inlet Oil Production by the Barrel and SPE Acreage
90.000.000.00
80.000.000.00
70,000,000.00
_  60,000,000.00 
o
f  o  50,000,000.00
40.000.000.00
30.000.000.00 
20,000,000.00 
10,000,000.00
^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^
Oil Prodcution Percentage SPE Acreage
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0)MTOV1_u<
M­o(V
CO■Mc0u1_0Cl
Figure 18 further supports that SPE begin to increase their share of acreage once peak 
production has passed. These graphs also indicate that production may not be the only driver, as there 
is not a smooth increase in SPE as reserves decline. This project also looks at whether commodity pricing 
could account for this discrepancy by plotting the percentage of SPE acreage against the adjusted annual 
average cost per barrel of oil in Figure 19 (McMahon, 2014). The original price has been adjusted to 
reflect its equivalent in 2014 dollars.
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Figure 17: Annual Oil Price Adjusted for Inflation and Cook Inlet SPE Acreage
Adjusted Price of Oil pBBL SPE Acreage
The shapes of the lines in Figure 19 suggest that SPE follow market cues for their presence in an 
oil field. When oil prices rise sharply, SPE appear in greater numbers a couple of years later. Similarly, 
the drop in commodity prices in the late 1990s precipitated a sharp exit of SPE in the early 2000s. This 
couple year delay can be accounted for by the time that it takes to set up a company, work out 
commercial deals, and receive transfer approval from ADNR. Although this study was unable to fully 
address this relationship, future analysis would benefit from some sort of regression to see if this visual 
relationship has numeric merit.
Analysis of the production and pricing indicators suggest that SPE may opportunistically move 
into oil fields when peak production has passed and large corporations are ready to move on. Further, 
their business model may be based upon a high enough price per barrel to continue extraction from 
maturing fields. When that price point is not met, they exit. Once they exit, the likelihood of their 
continued corporate existence is notably less than that of other companies.
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Conclusion
This project demonstrates that non-bonded coverage in Cook Inlet exposes the state to the risk 
of DR&R liability. The first layer of protection, current lessee capacity, can be jeopardized overnight by 
dynamic forces, such as commodity pricing. Even without the influence of external factors, the default 
probability of current lessees is predominantly medium risk or greater. The chain-of-title theory, which 
the state holds as an ultimate assurance, becomes more precarious as the links of the chain increase in 
number and weaker links are introduced. Analysis in this study shows that the number of weak links, 
qualified here as special purpose entities, has indeed increased over time as the hydrocarbons in the 
ground reach the end of their reserves.
State exposure is particularly acute when aging fields turn over to small entities. The state may 
institute policy measures or bonded assurances to insulate itself from this increased risk. One policy 
mechanism would be to shore up, or prevent special purpose entity link accumulation. More stringent 
standards, such as minimal requirements for corporate existence, could be set for transfers once 
reserves reach a certain percentage. Or, agreements could be made with the global parent of the 
special purpose entity that assigns the parent as the link in the chain of custody into perpetuity. In this 
way, even if the special purpose entity link disappears, a stronger company, with less degrees of 
separation likely, will be responsible.
Beyond looking at this as an issue of state liability, it may also be said that when companies are 
firmly on the hook, their liability becomes the state's asset. The state may decide to allow the 
abandonment in place or other partial removal of hydrocarbon infrastructure. California, Louisiana, and 
Texas all have programs that allow offshore platforms to be toppled in place, as a part of a rigs-to-reefs 
program, or left as navigational aids. These programs require that 50% of the cost that would have been 
spent on complete DR&R be placed into a state account to be used for residual liability or conservation 
purposes (Arcadis, 2014). The state may want to consider the establishment of such a program, or the 
tying of bonded assurances to the amount that would be put into one of these liability accounts.
It may be too late to significantly impact the chain-of-title for Cook Inlet. Reserves are low by 
any estimation, and weak link accumulation is already rampant. However, the lessons learned from 
Cook Inlet experience could potentially protect the state from facing a similar situation with the North
35
Slope. Shown in Figure 18, around 2006 the North Slope fields of Alaska reached the reserve level that 
triggered turnover of leases to special purpose entities in Cook Inlet.
Figure 18 High and Low Estimates of North Slope Produced Reserves
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In April, 2014, BP agreed to sell 15% of its assets in the North Slope to Hilcorp Alaska LLC 
(DeMarban, 2014). This transfer represents the first divesture of a large corporation on the North Slope 
to a smaller company. If history is any indicator, this is only the first of what will become an increasing 
trend. The nature and liability of DR&R obligations on the North Slope is several orders of magnitude 
greater than that of Cook Inlet. Policy decisions made now could make the chain-of-title theory a non­
bonded coverage that the state could more readily rely upon in the future.
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Appendix A: Bonded Coverage
This Appendix provides an introduction to the bonding requirements for hydrocarbon 
development in Alaska, shows the mechanisms used for current lessees, and discusses some of the 
implications for the bonded coverage.
Lease language and regulations require performance bonds to help ensure contract obligations 
are met. These bonds are handled through the AOGCC and the ADNR. Each agency has established 
minimum bonding standards based on per well or per acre calculations, as well as the option to post 
statewide bonds. For the table of bonded coverage provided, this study assumes that all companies 
have elected to post the statewide bond.
In addition to this baseline bonding, ADNR may,
Require a bond in a reasonable amount greater than the amount 
specified above in this paragraph where such greater amount is justified 
by the nature of the surface and its uses and improvements in the 
vicinity of said land and the degrees of risk involved with said operations 
being or to be carried out under the lease (ADOG, 2009).
ADNR wields this authority in a way that allows them to collect this extraordinary amount through 
means other than surety bonds, such as escrow accounts and parent guarantees. The extent of these 
backstops can be found in Assignment Approvals, Financial Assurances Agreements, court case 
documents, and Abandonment Agreements that are kept in the lease and unit case files. In addition, 
Unit agreement language contains provisions creating joint liability for resources held in common to 
produce participating areas.
Table 5 summarizes the extent of the bonded coverage available. It is arranged from left to right 
according to the order in which the backstops would need to be called upon. As a point of reference for 
these protections, the second column indicates the approximate percentage of acreage held by each 
company in Cook Inlet. Companies showing a 0% WIO holding have less than 1% of the acreage under 
their contracts. Moreover, the percentage of acreage does not necessarily correspond to the potential 
financial burden of their DR&R liabilities. For instance, XTO Energy Inc holds only two leases, ADL 18754 
and 18756. On these two leases are two of the twelve operating offshore platforms; therefore, their 
share of DR&R in the inlet would be greater than the 1%.
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Table 5 Bonded Coverage
Com pany % W IO  T D&B Risk ADNR Bond T AOGCC Bond T Additional Surety Z. Escrow Account Parent Guarantee T Unit A greem ents Z.
Apache A laska Co 2% Medi um $ 500,000.00 $ 200,000.00 N icolai Creek
Aurora Gas LLC 7% Low $ 500,000.00 $ 200,000.00
N icolai Creek, North 
Trad ing Bay
Buccaneer A laska LLC 0% High $ 500,000.00 $ 200,000.00
Con o co Ph illips A laska Inc 5% Low $ 500,000.00 $ 200,000.00
N icolai Creek, North 
Cook Inlet, North 
Trad ing Bay
Con o co Ph illips Com pany 4% Low $ 500,000.00 $ 200,000.00 North Cook Inlet
Cook Inlet Energy LLC 7% High $ 500,000.00 $ 200,000.00
$6,600,000.00 in 
bonds inherited from 
previous owners
$2,500,000 (balance as 
of 2/15). Periodic 
contributions pending
M iller Energy 
Resources: 
Unconditional 
guarantee
North Trad ing Bay, 
Trad ing Bay
ExxonM obil Oil 0% Low $ 500,000.00 $ 200,000.00
H ilcorp  A laska LLC 74% Medi um $ 500,000.00 $ 200,000.00 $105,000,000.00
Hilcorp  Energy I, L.P. 
guarantee cap of 
$17,150,000.00
N icolai Creek, North 
Trad ing Bay, Trad ing 
Bay
XTO Energy Inc 1% Low $ 500,000.00 $ 200,000.00 $3,000,000.00
Abandonm ent fund to 
equal $31,000,000.00. 
Payments to begin when 
sum  of fund plus NPV of 
reserves less than 150% 
of est. DR&R costs
ADNR chooses to require additional bonding and protections for 80% of the acreage in Cook 
Inlet, and 15 of the 16 platforms. The only offshore platform without extraordinary bonding is the 
Tyonek platform in North Cook Inlet, which is held by two subsidiaries of ConocoPhillips Corp, 
ConocoPhillips Alaska and the ConocoPhillips Company. Determining the adequacy of these protections 
is not prudent without a clear picture of the performance standards or cost estimates for DR&R 
performance. There are some inferences that can be made based on the data available.
XTO Energy Inc is the only company required to use a sinking fund. This fund was established in 
1998 when the estimated decommissioning date for the two platforms it serves was 2009. This fund 
allows XTO Energy Inc, whom at the time of transfer was called Cross Timbers Oil, to defer payments 
until the value of the reserves dips below 150% of the Net Present Value of the estimated cost of DR&R. 
The general estimates for how these payments would be structured are from Exhibit C of the 
Abandonment Funding Agreement, and shown in Figure 19 (Boy, 1999).
Figure 19 Example Payment Schedule from XTO Abandonment Agreement
Initial payment begins when the sum of the NPV of the fund and raserves<1507. of the present value of the abandonment costs. 
For Illustrative purposes, the principle of the fund is assumed to grow at an annual rate of 5%.
(thousands of dollars)_____________     (.000)
End of
Assumed 
NPV of 
Reserves 0  15%
Estimated 
Value of Fund 
before payment
SUM Of Fund 
and NPV Reserves
150% of PV of 
$31 MM DR&R ©5% 
or limit of fund
Difference between 
150%PV & SUM
Date Report 
Prepared and 
Payment Made
Annual
Payment
Annual
Withdrawal
1998 $44,429 $0 $44,429 $27,859 $16,570 1-May-99 $0 $0
1999 $42,073 $0 $42,073 $28,547 $13,526 1-May-00 $0 $0
2000 $34,495 $0 $34,495 $29,974 $4,520 1-May-01 $0 $0
2001 $25,168 $0 $25,168 $31.473 $6,305 1 -May-02 $6,305 $0
2002 $17,820 $6,620 $24,440 $33,047 •$8,607 1-May-03 $8,607 $0
2003 $12,039 $15,988 $28,027 $34,699 $6,672 1-May-04 $6,672 $0
2004 $7,736 $23,793 $31,529 $36,434 -$4,905 1-May-05 $4,905 $0
2005 $4,757 530,133 $34,890 $38,256 •$3,365 1-May-06 $867 $0
2006 $2,747 $31,000 $33,747 $31,000 $2,747 1-May-07 $0 $1,550
2007 $1,439 $31,000 $32,439 $31,000 $1,439 1-May-08 SO $1,550
2008 $636 $31,000 $31,636 $31,000 $636 1-May-09 $0 $1,550
2009 $193 $31,000 $31,193 $31,000 $193 1-May-10 $0 $1,550
2010 $193 S32,550 $32,743 $32,550 $193 1-May-11 $0 $0
2011 $193 534,178 $34,370 $34,178 $ 193 1-May-12 $0 $0
2012 $193 S35.545 $35,737 $35,866 ■$149 1-May-13 5149 $0
NOTES:
1) Cross Timbers will make contributions to the fund through 2009 whenever the sum ol a) the value of the lund and b) the NPV of the 
reserves Is less than the PV ol 150% of DR&R, until the fund reaches S31MM. After the fund reaches its limit of S31MM through 2009, or S31 MM 
compounded ®  5% thereafter, any excess earnings of the fund are available for withdrawal by Cross Timbers.
2) In this example, during :he year 2006. and until alter 2009, withdrawals are made from the lund lor the balance over S31MM. In 2005, the 
balance ol (he sinking tunc is only 5867,000 below (he ceiling of 531 MM so the payment is limited to lhat amount.
No withdrawals are made alter 2009 when Ihe fund's assumed earnings of 5% equal the stipulated 5% compounding of the abandonment cost.
3) If abandonment occurs beyond 2009, the $31 MM abandonment cost grows by 5% annually compounded 
and likewise the S31MM ceiling ol the sinking iund increases at a compounded rate of 5%.
4) The year 2012 demonstrates that if the lund generates only 4% return instead ol 5%, then a lund payment is made by Cross Timbers lor the 
difference between Ihe sum ol the npv of Ihe reserves and sinking lund. and Ihe compounded cost of Ihe abandonment costs.
Smaller companies that enter Cook Inlet contend that large extraordinary bonding is a hindrance 
to investment and exploration because it uses up any capital a company may have upfront. By 
structuring these payments in such a way, this sinking fund appears to offer a solution to this problem 
by making the payments in smaller portions spread out over a few years. Further, it allows investments 
to the fund to gain interest, increasing the value of the account without extra expenditures by the 
company. The example shown even allows for withdraws to be made by the company once the agreed 
upon sum has been met.
The state did not use this sinking fund as its only backstop. It also required a $3,000,000 upfront 
performance bond should XTO Energy Inc not remain long enough for the fund to reach maturity. These 
bonds are then further supported by a guarantee that Shell, the previous owner, remains liable as a 
surety for all obligations. Indeed, of all the bonded assurances in Cook Inlet, those covering the XTO A 
and C platforms are by far the most robust.
Hilcorp Alaska LLC owns the majority of the infrastructure and acreage in Cook Inlet. Since 2011, 
they purchased WIO from PERL, Marathon Alaska Production LLC, ExxonMobil Oil, Aurora Gas LLC, and 
Union Oil Co. For each of these transfers, the state added amendments to the Financial Assurance 
Agreement (FAA) negotiated with the original transfer. The most recent version, from November 2014, 
also includes assets purchased from BP on the North Slope.
For the Cook Inlet properties, the state required Hilcorp Alaska LLC to post a $105,000,000 
surety bond. This bond is further backed by a parent guarantee from Hilcorp Energy I. L.P. capped at 
$17,150,000. An interesting feature of this FAA is the means by which these figures are calculated. Every 
three years, Hilcorp Alaska LLC must have a third party contractor perform a cost estimate of the DR&R 
obligations. The bonding and parent guarantee are to continually evolve to equal 17.5% of the 
estimated DR&R cost minus Union's reimbursement obligations to Hilcorp, per their PSA. There is no 
rationale provided, however, as to why 17.5% is deemed to be a sufficient enough of a backstop for the 
state, especially when entities such as XTO Energy Inc are expected to eventually secure 100% of the 
expected cost. These differing figures highlight how without clear performance standards the actions 
and securities required by the state can change with administrations.
Cook Inlet Energy LLC can be considered one of the most high risk lessees presently in Cook 
Inlet. It also happened to inherit a platform and unit with a high risk history. The original installer of the 
Osprey platform, located in the Redoubt Unit, was Forcenergy, a company that went bankrupt before
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the project was complete. Since that time, the property was also owned by Pacific Energy Alaska 
Operations LLC, the subsidiary of the bankrupt PERL. The state retained the $3 million and $3.6 million in 
bonds it collected from Forcenergy and PERL and keeps them in an account for eventual DR&R. In 
addition to this, the state has set up an escrow account that Cook Inlet Energy LLC periodically submits 
to. Estimates received from the Commercial Division at ADOG have the balance at approximately $2.5 
million as of February 2015.
Using the cost estimates in Appendix B, the total value of bonded coverage in Cook Inlet is 
approximately 20 -  25% of the total estimated cost of DR&R performance.
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Appendix B: Cost Estimates
According to existing policy, the DR&R of offshore platforms could be as minimal as the P&A 
standards of the AOGCC; or, it could mean complete removal of the structure and the restoration of the 
sea floor. For this reason, prior attempts at creating a cost estimate for this obligation have produced a 
wide range of potential values. For a general understanding, the following estimates have been pulled 
from a variety of public documents.
• The Abandonment Agreement between the state and Cross Timbers Oil Co in 1998 estimates 
the cost of DR&R for the XTO A and XTO C platforms to be $31,000,000.00 (Boy, 1999).
• Pacific Energy Resources Ltd. bankruptcy documents from 2009 estimate the cost of 
abandonment of the Spurr platform to be between $21,000,000 and $35,000,000 (PERL 
Banuptcy Proceedings, 2009).
• The Financial Assurances Agreement between the state and Hilcorp Alaska LLC from November 
2014 estimates that the DR&R of twelve platforms and associated infrastructure and facilities on 
their share of leases in Cook Inlet to cost ~ $700,000,000 (ADNR, 2014).
• A Cook Inlet Keeper report calculates the total cost to DR&R all 16 offshore platforms and 160 
miles of oil pipelines ranging between $402,000,000 and $1.1 billion (Talberth, 2013)
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